Welcome to 2033: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 160 experts [atlanticcouncil.org] (fb2) читать постранично, страница - 3


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greater pessimism.

Overall, in a clear counterpoint to the IEA’s assessment, a majority of respondents don’t think greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2033. The experts we polled are only a bit more bullish about that peak and decline happening within the next decade (35 percent) as they are about humans safely landing on Mars and returning to Earth during that period (23 percent). Only 6 percent strongly agree that we’ll see emissions peaking and declining over the next ten years.

On a separate question, respondents on balance were also more inclined to agree (39 percent) than disagree (35 percent) that by 2033 humans likely will have begun deliberate, large-scale geoengineering of the planet (for example, seeding the atmosphere with aerosols) in order to reduce the impacts of climate change—indicating that a slight plurality presumably think those climate impacts will be big enough by that point to spur such a controversial and consequential move.

7. Get ready for even greater global volatility

One remarkable survey result is how many respondents expect the world to face additional economic and public-health perils in the coming decade. Seventy-six percent predict another global economic crisis on the scale of the 2008-2009 financial crisis by 2033. A further 19 percent say that there will be two or more such crises. Forty-nine percent foresee another global pandemic with the scale and impact of COVID-19 breaking out by 2033, with an additional 16 percent anticipating two or more such pandemics.

These results might reflect recency bias, where recent experience of crises leaves us more concerned about others occurring. But they may also suggest more troubling trends, including a coming era of more frequent and intense public-health emergencies  rather than once-in-a-century pandemics as well as a return to historical economic patterns after the relative calm of the post-World War II decades; between 1908 and 1946, five global recessions brought about greater declines  in global per-capita gross domestic product than did the 2008-2009 crisis—amounting to more than one per decade.

8. The tug of war between democracy and autocracy will persist, with democracies potentially losing some ground

Our respondents as a whole do not foresee a clear triumph for either democrats or autocrats over the next ten years. More expect the number of democracies in the world to shrink (37 percent) than to grow (29 percent). But almost all forecast any change to be modest: Just 4 percent foresee many more or many fewer democracies by 2033. Thirty-five percent believe the world will have roughly the same number of democracies as it does today. (It’s worth noting that we asked about the future number  of democracies, not the projected strength or type of these democracies.)

When asked open-ended questions about which countries are most likely to move from democracy to autocracy or the reverse by 2033, respondents most frequently chose “none.” Notably, 46 percent foresaw no shifts from autocracy toward democracy and just 31 percent predicted no countries going in the other direction, which is consistent with respondents’ general view that overall change will be modest but trending away from democracy.

Democracy and autocracy, moreover, are not necessarily distinct categories. For example, several countries—including Hungary, Turkey, and Russia—are cited both as autocracies likely to become democracies or democracies likely to become autocracies, suggesting that some respondents have differing views on how to categorize these countries.

Also notable: A small but significant minority of 9 percent of all respondents—and 10 percent of US respondents—selected the United States as the democratic country most likely to grow autocratic by 2033. Some respondents’ views on the future of US and global democracy appear to be linked, suggesting that they see the United States as the most important democratic country and guardian of global democracy. Among those who foresee either no change or a decline in the number of democracies worldwide, 12 percent expect the United States to become autocratic—their top choice. For those who expect the number of democracies to expand, none predict an autocratic United States.

9. Democracies will face a difficult decade of systemic dangers

Democracies are entering a dangerous decade in which they will need to contend with nationalist and populist forces and all the challenges associated with rapidly evolving technology. When asked which social movements they expected to have the most political influence worldwide over the next ten years, only 5 percent of respondents chose pro-democracy ones—whereas a majority picked either nationalist or populist movements. A third of respondents went with movements advocating for other causes often associated with democratic societies: the environment, youth issues, and women’s rights.

Admittedly, nationalists and populists are not invariably more supportive of autocratic political systems than democratic ones. Nor are, say, youth movements invariably opposed to autocracy. But our survey responses pointed to a connection between gathering nationalist and populist strength and greater popular pressure toward autocracy. Among those who foresee fewer democracies in the next decade, 68 percent predict increasing political influence for populist or nationalist movements and just 2 percent growing clout for pro-democracy ones. Of those forecasting more democracies, the equivalent figures are 38 percent and 10 percent.

Trends in mass communication and new technologies also present potential perils for democracies. Against the backdrop of a tech sector undergoing great transformation—from new regulatory efforts to the corporate upheaval at social-media companies to the ways in which these platforms have been caught up in broader political polarization—over half of respondents (53 percent) predict that social media will prove a net negative for democracies by 2033. Only 15 percent think it will be a net positive—a remarkable shift away from the dream, so prevalent during the early Arab Spring era, of social media as a democratizing force. Eighteen percent say that social media will have so evolved over the next ten years as to make the question impossible to answer.

For those who forecast a reduction in the number of democracies around the world, a large share (69 percent) expect social media to be a net negative for democracies.

Another compelling finding involved optimism about the speed with which some disruptive technologies—specifically commercial quantum computing, level 5 autonomous vehicles (where the vehicle performs all tasks under all driving conditions without the need of human input), and artificial general intelligence (where computers and machines exhibit human-like intelligence and creativity)—will be developed. In all three cases, majorities of respondents (between 57 percent and 68 percent) agree that these technologies will exist and/or be commercially viable by 2033. Although all three technologies promise enormous benefits for humankind, they also will raise challenges related to the future of work and income, public health and safety, national security, and democratic governance, among other domains. Democracies will need to ground the development and implementation of such technologies within democratic norms and values through appropriate regulation and standards and via international cooperation.

Through their answers across several questions, respondents raised the prospect of two contrasting scenarios for the coming decade. One of a world with democracy in decline, corroded by nationalism, populism, and social media, with a more autocratic United States deepening the trend. And another—predicted by a minority—of a world where democracy is ascendant, bolstered by